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Since its inception in 1871, and characterization in the Supreme
Court case of Monroe v. Pape, 42 U.S.C. §1983 has caused turmoil
among commentators concerned with this statute’s application in the
area of constitutional rights.
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The Search for a Section 1983 Right Under the
Dormant Commerce Clause
Since its inception in 1871, and characterization in the Supreme
Court case of Monroe v. Pape, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has caused turmoil
among commentators concerned with this statute's application in the
area of constitutional rights.' The focus of this comment is to describe
1. As stated by the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171
(1961), section 1983 is derived from the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, §
1, 17 Stat. 13 (1873) [hereinafter 42 U.S.C. § 1983]. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, priv-
ileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Con-
gress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered
to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
The commentators concerned with section 1983 focus primarily on its protection of
"any rights" secured by the Constitution and laws of the federal government. See, e.g.,
Note, Section 1983 Remedies for the Violation of Supremacy Clause Rights, 97 YALE
L.J. 1827 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Section 1983 Remedies]; Note, Dormant Com-
merce Clause Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Protecting the Right To Be Free of
Protectionist State Action, 86 MICH. L. REv. 157 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Dormant
Commerce Clause Claims]; Spurrier, Federal Constitutional Rights: Priceless or
Worthless? Awards of Money Damages Under Section 1983, 20 TULSA L.J. 1 (1984);
Comment, The Commerce Clause: Allocating Provision or Individual Right? Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S.Ct. 126 (1984)., 7 U. ARK. LITTLE RoCK L.J. 757 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, The
Commerce Clause].
Other commentators have noted the problem section 1983 created by opening the
proverbial "floodgates of litigation." See, e.g., Matasar, Personal Immunities Under
Section 1983: The Limits of the Court's Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REv. 741,
742 n.8 (1987) (quoting Justice Rehnquist's complaint in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,
91 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), about the "'staggering effect of [section] 1983
claims upon the workload of the federal courts . . .'" ); Note, Is the Section 1983
Civil Rights Statute Overworked? Expanded Use of Magistrates-An Alternative to
Exhaustion, 17 .U. MICH. J.L. REF. 361 (1984) (generally discussing the problems with
overuse of 42 U.S.C. § 1983). But see Note, Section 1983 Remedies, supra, at 1845-
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the nature of the constitutional rights which are covered by section
1983 for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. §
1988.2 The obvious choices are those individual or personal rights
which fall within the purview of the Bill of Rights and the Civil War
amendments, and these will be addressed in the sections which follow. 3
However, the more controversial issue is whether the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution embodies personal rights which are implicated in
the statutory language of section 1983 and section 1988 to allow the
courts to award attorney's fees to plaintiffs who have been granted re-
lief from burdensome state statutes.4
The Supreme Court has denied certiorari several times to cases
involving the Commerce Clause issue,5 but has now granted certiorari
2. Section 1988 provides in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982,
1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1980). Courts have also stated that a party who prevails on a
ground other than section 1983 is entitled to attorney's fees under section 1988 if sec-
tion 1983 would have been an appropriate basis of relief. See J & J Anderson, Inc. v.
Town of Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1473 (10th Cir. 1985). Thus, it is not mandatory that a
section 1983 claim of relief be brought in the plaintiff's original complaint in order to
get attorney's fees later.
3. These rights were expressly considered by the Forty-second Congress in the
debates prior to passage of the then Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 because the act was
passed in the wake of the fourteenth amendment. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
180 (1960).
4. This comment is concerned with state regulation under the dormant commerce
clause doctrine where a state may regulate or infringe upon, within certain limits, in-
terstate commerce when Congress has not legislated pursuant to its Commerce Clause
power. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). This situation
is to be distinguished from that where the state passes statutes in conflict with extant
congressional statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause and which, therefore,
causes the Supremacy Clause to be invoked to defeat the conflicting state regulation of
interstate commerce. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 8.1 (3d ed. 1986); Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Claims, supra note 1, at
158 n.11.
5. See, e.g., Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984); Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Secretary of State,
503 A.2d 214 (Me.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1129 (1986). Justices White, Brennan, and
O'Connor dissented from the denial of certiorari in Private Truck Council. 476 U.S. at
1129. The dissenting Justices recognized a conflict of authority b-.tween the Eighth
Circuit in Consolidated Freightways Corp., 730 F.2d 1139, and the Third Circuit in
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to Dennis v. State, in which the Nebraska Supreme Court denied plain-
tiff's motion for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.6 In Dennis, the
Nebraska court based its reasoning on that of several federal courts
which have also determined that the Commerce Clause does not confer
individual rights within the meaning of section 1983 which would allow
an award of fees under section 1988.7 However, the courts that have
considered the Commerce Clause issue failed to define what a right was
before considering whether a right existed under the Commerce
Clause.8
The goal of this comment is to derive the meaning of rights, and
then to see if these rights are included as part of the Commerce Clause
structure. Section one discusses the reasoning of the Nebraska Su-
preme Court's decision in Dennis in order to gain some bearing on this
analysis. Section two's analysis results in a definition of "rights" which
fits into the scheme of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This definition is derived from
a consideration of the plain meaning and the legislative history of sec-
tion 1983, as well as from the history of the Commerce Clause, and the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area. Section three considers the
nature of the Commerce Clause as a mechanism which allocates power
between the state and federal governments. This section shows that the
Commerce Clause serves only to provide "benefits" for individuals that
are not encompassed by section 1983's meaning of "rights." Section
Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980), and would have granted cer-
tiorari on this basis. Private Truck Council, 476 U.S. at 1129. This opinion shows that
there are members of the Court who recognize that an issue exists concerning whether
the Commerce Clause secures individual rights within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
6. Dennis v. State, 234 Neb. 427, 451 N.W.2d 676, cert. granted sub nom. Den-
nis v. Higgins, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990). The question that the Court granted certiorari
based upon was, "[i]s the claim that state tax discriminates against interstate com-
merce in violation of Commerce Clause and that seeks injunction against enforcement
of tax cognizable under 42 USC § 1983?" 58 U.S.L.W. 3749 (U.S. May 29, 1990)
(No. 89-1555). It was not Kansas' statutory scheme which was at issue, as stated in 58
U.S.L.W. 3749, but rather Nebraska's taxation of out-of-state motor carriers.
7. See, e.g., Consolidated Freightways Corp., 730 F.2d 1139; Private Truck
Council, 503 A.2d 214. These and other cases denying the existence of Commerce
Clause rights to plaintiffs seeking attorney's fees based on section 1983 and section
1988 will be considered in more detail in section four of this comment.
8. See Note, Section 1983 Remedies, supra note 1; Note, Dormant Commerce
Clause Claims, supra note 1. Several commentators also fail to define what a right is
before questioning whether one exists under the Commerce Clause. See Note, Dormant
Commerce Clause Claims, supra note 1; Comment, The Commerce Clause, supra note
1991]
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four uses these considerations to examine the Nebraska Supreme
Court's decision in Dennis and concludes that it was correct in holding
that the Commerce Clause is not a source of rights cognizable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore, that section 1988 attorney's fees were
precluded.
I. The Decision In Dennis v. State
Dennis v. State is a typical case involving yet another state's at-
tempt to tax out-of-state people for use of the state's highways.' How-
ever, the case is one of the relatively few involving a plaintiff attempt-
ing to secure a claim of relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an
impingement of a Commerce Clause "right" in order to get attorney's
fees under section 1988.10 In Dennis, the plaintiff, Mark E. Dennis,
claimed that Nebraska had exacted taxes pursuant to two statutes11
9. See, e.g., State v. Private Truck Council, 258 Ga. 531, 371 S.E.2d 378 (1988);
Private Truck Council v. State, 128 N.H. 466, 517 A.2d 1150 (1986).
10. See Consolidated Freightways Corp., 730 F.2d 1139; Private Truck Council,
258 Ga. 531, 371 S.E.2d 378; Private Truck Council, 128 N.H. 466, 517 A.2d 1150;
Private Truck Council, 503 A.2d 214.
11. The first statute read: "
Trucks, truck-tractors, semitrailers, trailers, or buses, from states
other than Nebraska, entering Nebraska shall be required to comply with
all the laws and regulations of any nature imposed on Nebraska trucks
. . . and to comply with all the requirements as to payment of all license
fees, permit fees, and fees of whatever character which owners of trucks
.. . owned and operated in Nebraska, are required to pay when operating
in such foreign state, unless the state or states, in which such trucks...
are domiciled, grant reciprocity comparable to that extended by the laws
of Nebraska.
Dennis, 234 Neb. at 443, 451 N.W.2d at 685-86 (emphasis in original) (quoting NEB.
REv. STAT. § 60-305.02 (1984)). The second statute provided:
(1) In case a foreign state . . . is not reciprocal as to license fees on
commercial trucks . . . the owners of such nonresident vehicles from those
states or territories will be required to pay the same license fees as are
charged residents of this state in such foreign state or territory. In case no
fees are charged in Nebraska on trucks . . . other than license fees, and
the reciprocity law of any other foreign state . . . does not act to exempt
Nebraska trucks . . . operating in that state from payment of all fees
whatsoever, the owners of such foreign trucks. . . shall be required to pay
a fee in an amount equal to the fee of whatever character, other than
license fee, is charged by such other state to foreign trucks . . ..
(7) Properly registered shall mean a vehicle licensed or registered in
one of the following: . . . (b) the jurisdiction in which a commercial vehi-
[Vol. 15
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which violated the Commerce Clause 2 and the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause' 3 of the United States Constitution, and which also gave
rise to a claim of relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by depriving him of
constitutional rights. 4
The plaintiff in Dennis owned and operated a trucking company
with its principal place of business in Ohio."5 As part of this business,
plaintiff owned one tractor and two trailers, all registered in Ohio.'"
Due to the Ohio registration, plaintiff was subject to a one to two cent
tax per mile while driving in Nebraska, because Ohio exacted the same
tax of Nebraska-registered vehicles operating in Ohio. 17
The trial court held that the statutes constituted an undue burden
on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause and en-
joined their enforcement.' 8 However, the trial court dismissed the
counts under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for failure to allege facts sufficient to support the action. 19 Rather
than award attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the trial
cle is registered, where the operation in which such vehicle is used has a
principal place of business therein, and from or in which the vehicle is
most frequently dispatched, garaged, serviced, maintained, operated, or
otherwise controlled, and the vehicle is assigned to such principal place of
business ....
Dennis, 234 Neb. at 443-44, 451 N.W.2d at 686 (emphasis in original) (quoting NEB.
REV. STAT. § 60-305.03(1), (7) (1984)). Both statutes were amended after the trial
court's decision, thus making the Commerce Clause issue moot in respect to Nebraska.
Dennis, 234 Neb. at 429, 451 N.W.2d at 678 (referencing NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 60-
305.02 to .03 (1988)).
12. "The Congress shall have the Power [tjo ... regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, ci. 2.
13. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities
of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I.
14. Dennis, 234 Neb. at 428, 451 N.W.2d at 677-78. The plaintiff also sought to
enjoin enforcement of the statutes "as a grant by the Legislature of special and exclu-
sive privileges, immunities, and franchises in violation of [the Nebraska Constitution]
.... " Id. at 428, 451 N.W.2d at 677. The trial court ruled that plaintiff failed to
prove this violation and dismissed the action. Id. at 428-29, 451 N.W.2d at 678.
Though the Nebraska Supreme Court noted that this was an issue below, it made no
further mention of the action in its opinion.
15. Id. at 442, 451 N.W.2d at 685.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 428, 451 N.W.2d at 678.
19. Id. at 428-29, 451 N.W.2d at 678.
1991]
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court stated that the "plaintiff and his attorneys are entitled under the
[e]quitable [f]und [d]octrine to payment of their expenses and reasona-
ble fees."' 20 Based on the trial court's opinion, the pertinent issue raised
on appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court was whether the statutes'
impermissible burden on interstate commerce created a claim cogniza-
ble under section 1983 so as to allow attorney's fees under section
1988.21
20. The equitable fund doctrine provides that,
when one by active litigation creates, or increases a fund in which others
are entitled to share, those others should bear a portion of the litigation
expenses, and that they can be made to do so by charging the fund with
the reasonable expenses of the litigant who preserves or augments it.
D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.8, at 200 (1973). The plaintiff claimed that the fund consisted
of the total amount of taxes collected by Nebraska that would be subject to refund.
Dennis, 234 Neb. at 429, 451 N.W.2d at 678. The trial court did not agree with this
contention and left to another day the determination of what fund, if any, was available
for payment of the fees. Id.
21. This is the same issue upon which the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Dennis v. Higgins, 58 U.S.L.W. 3749 (U.S. May 29, 1990) (No. 89-1555).
Two other issues were raised to the Nebraska Supreme Court: first, whether enforce-
ment of the statutes violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and also, whether
the trial court erred in awarding fees under the equitable fund doctrine. Dennis, 234
Neb. at 429, 451 N.W.2d at 678. On the first issue, the Nebraska Supreme Court held
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was not violated by the taxation of the out-
of-state trucks. Id. at 445, 451 N.W.2d at 686. The court first noted that the Supreme
Court decision in Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1948), precluded only "'clas-
sifications based on the fact of non-citizenship unless there is something to indicate that
non-citizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed.''"
Dennis, 234 Neb. at 443, 451 N.W.2d at 685. The Nebraska Supreme Court then
observed that Nebraska's statutory scheme did not impose taxation based on the "resi-
dent or nonresident status of the motor carrier, but [was] based upon the state where
the particular vehicle [was] registered." Id. at 444, 451 N.W.2d at 686. Under this
statute then, even residents of Nebraska would be taxed if they drove vehicles which
were covered by the statute and registered in a state other than Nebraska. Id. The
court concluded that since plaintiff was taxed simply because his tractor was registered
in Ohio, and because Nebraska residents would also be taxed under the same circum-
stances, the statute was not one which discriminated against out-of-state citizens in
violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 444-45, 451 N.W.2d at 686.
In an alternative holding on the Privileges and Immunities Clause issue, the court
first reasoned that only out-of-state citizens had standing to challenge violations of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 445, 451 N.W.2d at 686. See also Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). The court concluded that because plaintiff did
not even allege that he was a citizen of another state in his complaint, he did not have
standing to bring the Privileges and Immunities Clause challenge against the statutes.
Dennis, 234 Neb. at 445, 451 N.W.2d at 686.
[Vol. 15
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The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the Commerce Clause did
not secure rights cognizable under section 1983 which would allow an
attorney's fee award under section 1988.22 Therefore, the court af-
firmed the trial court's dismissal of this claim.23 In its decision, the
court first noted that there was a conflict of authority on the Commerce
Clause issue and decided, after considering the main cases in the area,
that the "better reasoned cases hold that there is no cause of action
under section 1983 for violations of the [C]ommerce [C]lause."24 The
court relied primarily on the Eighth Circuit decision in Consolidated
Freightways Corp. v. Kassel,25 and other cases which make reference
to it,26 for the proposition that the Commerce Clause is a constitutional
The next issue was raised by the defendant, the State of Nebraska, and questioned
whether the trial court erred in allowing plaintiff his fees and costs pursuant to the
equitable fund doctrine. The court stated that the doctrine "presupposes the existence
of a fund . . .and requires the prevailing party to have brought suit to preserve or
protect [the] fund . . . ." Id. at 445, 451 N.W.2d at 687. Moreover, the fund must be
an "immediate fund" which the court must have control over from the beginning of the
trial, and from which the court can award attorney's fees and costs at trial. Id. at 446,
451 N.W.2d at 687. In Dennis however, the court stated that "[t]here is no fund in this
case, much less a fund within the jurisdiction of the trial court." Id. On this note, the
court held that it was error for the trial court to award fees based on the equitable fund
doctrine. Id. at 445, 451 N.W.2d at 688. The court also noted that Nebraska "has not
waived its sovereign immunity as to attorney fees under the circumstances such as this
case." Id. at 448, 451 N.W.2d at 688. Thus, in a second alternative holding, the court
reversed the trial court's decision to award fees under the doctrine.
Finally, the Commerce Clause violation was not appealed by Nebraska because
the state revised the two tax statutes that were in issue. See supra note 11.
22. Dennis, 234 Neb. at 430, 451 N.W.2d at 678.
23. Id. at 448, 451 N.W.2d at 688.
24. Id. at 430, 451 N.W.2d at 678.
25. 730 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984).
26. Dennis, 234 Neb. at 430-32, 451 N.W.2d at 678-80 (citing Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 730 F.2d 1139). The Dennis court also relied on several federal and
state cases which had cited Consolidated Freightways Corp. in support of their deci-
sions. See Kraft v. Jacka, 872 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1989); J & J Anderson v. Town of
Erie, 767 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1985); Pesticide Pub. Policy Found. v. Village of
Wauconda, 622 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Ill. 1985), af'd, 826 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987);
State v. Private Truck Council, Inc., 258 Ga. 531, 371 S.E.2d 378 (1988); Private
Truck Council, Inc. v. State, 221 N.J. Super. 89, 534 A.2d 13 (1987), aff'd, 111 N.J.
214, 544 A.2d 33 (1988); Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Secretary of State, 503 A.2d
214 (Me.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1129 (1986); Private Truck Council, Inc. v. State,
128 N.H. 466, 517 A.2d 1150 (1986). In all of these cases, the court distinguished
sections of the Constitution which confer individual rights from those which serve only
to allocate power between the levels of government. These cases, and their distinction,
will be considered in more detail in section four of this comment. Note at this point,
7
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provision which allocates power between the state and the federal gov-
ernments. Further, the court recognized, in reliance upon the Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp. decision, that the most individuals can expect
of the dormant commerce clause limit on the states is an indirect bene-
fit from its enforcement, a benefit which is "not the same thing as a
'right' secured by the Constitution Within the meaning of section
1983."s7
The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected other cases which stated
that individuals had a right to engage in interstate commerce. For in-
stance, the court adopted the reasoning of Consolidated Freightways
Corp., which discredited "'two earlier federal cases stating terse hold-
ings going the other way . ..neither of [which] . . . analyzed the
merits of extending section 1983 to encompass violations of the Com-
merce Clause, but rather merely relied on generalized statements in
Supreme Court cases that did not involve the Commerce Clause is-
sue.' ",28 The court also dismissed several United States Supreme Court
references to a right to engage in interstate commerce based on the
Eighth Circuit's dismissal of the same in Consolidated Freightways
Corp. .29 Thus concluding that the Commerce Clause did not secure
however, that these cases all beg the question of what a right is. Rather than define the
term, the authorities rely on the happenstance of the Forty-second Congress' limited
use of the term "rights" well over 100 years ago, as well as the Supreme Court's usage
in contexts unrelated to the present question of Commerce Clause rights. Beginning in
section two, this comment draws on these sources in arriving at a general definition of
rights which can be applied to a modern question never considered in the past debates
and cases.
27. Dennis, 234 Neb. at 432, 451 N.W.2d at 680.
28. Id. at 438-39, 451 N.W.2d at 683. The two cases cited in this reference are
Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980), and Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Mont. 1975), aff'd on other grounds,
425 U.S. 463 (1976). These are discussed in section four of this comment.
29. Dennis, 234 Neb. at 432, 451 N.W.2d at 679-80. These cases were: Garrity
v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216
U.S. 1 (1910); and Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891). The Garrity reference
to a right to engage in interstate commerce was considered "mere dictum." Dennis, 234
Neb. at 432, 451 N.W.2d at 679. The references in Western Union and Crutcher were
viewed by the Nebraska Supreme Court as focusing on the separation of powers be-
tween the federal and state legislatures which, therefore, excluded the Commerce
Clause as a right securing provision. These cases are further considered in note 148,
along with three other cases that were not mentioned in Dennis, but which do refer to a
"right" to engage in interstate commerce: namely, Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas
Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911), Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 3:5 (1868), and Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
[Vol. 15
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section 1983 rights, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the action. The following sections of this comment
consider the underlying forces of the rights/benefits distinction, which
is made by the Nebraska court in Dennis, to support the conclusion
that the Commerce Clause does not afford rights to individuals which
can be vindicated by a section 1983 action.
II. The Definition of a Section 1983 Right
The failing in cases like Dennis is that the courts do not define
section 1983 rights before considering the Commerce Clause issue, and
whether the plaintiff can get attorney's fees under section 1988. The
problem the courts face in this respect is that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 uses
the term "rights" without providing a definition which would aid in
determining what these rights are, and whether such rights exist under
the Commerce Clause. In order to discover the meaning of "rights"
then, the courts must resort to statutory interpretation tools. Of impor-
tance here is the plain meaning rule which provides that "where the
[statutory] language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning
the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid
doubtful meanings need no discussion."30 However, where the statute's
language is vague or ambiguous, the courts will then look to the legisla-
tive history of the statute to surmise congressional intent on how the
ambiguous term should be applied."' The first inquiry, then, looks to
the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to determine the scope and meaning
of the term "rights."
A. The Plain Meaning of Section 1983
Under the plain meaning doctrine, two questions exist with respect
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The first of these considers the scope of "rights,"
as the word is used in section 1983, because "rights" is modified by the
term "any" in the statute. The second question asks what is a "right"
30. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (citing Hamilton v.
Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421 (1899)). The import of the Court's statement is that the
Court will first look to determine if terms used in the statute are vague or ambiguous.
If the terms are neither vague nor ambiguous, the Court will then base its decision on
the plain meaning of the statute.
31. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 Am. U.L. REV.
277, 285 (1990).
1991] •271
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within the meaning of section 1983.
Section 1983 uses the words "any rights. . . secured by the Con-
stitution and laws ... *"32 Use of the term "any," without other words
to modify it, would seem to suggest that any right which exists under
the Constitution and federal statutes would be within the ambit of sec-
tion 1983. However, early Supreme Court cases declined to give such a
broad reading to this statute.33 For instance, the Court in Holt v. Indi-
ana Manufacturing Co. 34 refused to extend section 1983 coverage be-
yond "civil rights," while in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organ-
ization35 it drew a tenuous distinction between "personal" and
"property" rights, the former included as section 1983 rights while the
latter was not. These cases restricting the scope of section 1983 have
since been overruled by the modern Supreme Court which is eager to
confirm the existence of constitutionally and statutorily created rights
in order to meet the broad language of "any rights" used by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.6 Indeed, as one commentator has noted, "the Supreme Court
has never placed a constitutional provision outside section 1983 .' 37 Sev-
eral cases support this proposition including Maine v. Thiboutot,38
32. See supra note 1 for the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
33. See generally Note, Section 1983 Remedies, supra note 1, at 1834-35.
34. 176 U.S. 68, 73 (1900).
35. 307 U.S. 496, 531 (1939). The plurality in Hague was actually interpreting
the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1343, the jurisdictional counterpart of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
which gives the district courts original jurisdiction in section 1983 suits. The language
used in section 1343 is practically the same as that used in section 1983:
Civil rights and elective franchise
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:...
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Con-
gress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the ju-
risdiction of the United States ....
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1982).
36. See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (overruling the
personal/property rights distinction established by Hague, 307 U.S. 496, and limiting
the Holt, 176 U.S. 68, "civil rights" restriction of section 1983 to its facts). But see
Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317 (1885) (Contracts Clause does not secure rights
within the meaning of section 1983); Poirier v. Hodges, 445 F. Supp. 838 (M.D. Fla.
1978) (same).
37. Note, Section 1983 Remedies, supra note 1, at 1835.
38. 448 U.S. 1 (1979) (stating generally, section 1983 encompasses violations of
both constitutional and federal statutory rights).
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West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,3 9 Lane v. Wil-
son,4" Brown v. Board of Education," and Lynch v. Household Fi-
nance Corp..42 Due to the Court's broad interpretation of section 1983,
if an individual right exists under the Commerce Clause, this right
would likely be included within the meaning of rights protected by sec-
tion 1983.
Unlike its usefulness in determining the scope of "rights" which
section 1983 invokes, the plain meaning doctrine provides no guidance
in defining what a right is under section 1983. Indeed, it has been rec-
ognized that "'plain meaning' is too simplistic a guide to the construc-
tion of section 1983.""' This is especially so because the Court has not
provided a clear test which could be used to determine what a right is
under section 1983.44 Without a statutory or Court-formulated test for
determining what a right is, the plain meaning rule is of no avail be-
cause it would leave the Court to answer the question on intuition
alone. Where the plain meaning rule provides no guidance in determin-
ing how a statute's terms are to be applied or interpreted, the Court
should next resort to the legislative history of the statute and other
"extra-statutory materials pertaining to what happened before and dur-
ing the passage of the law to explain language that is ambiguous
. . ," The legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is, therefore, in-
valuable, because the plain meaning rule cannot be usefully applied
due to the ambiguous nature of the term "rights."" Considering this
history, as well as other notions of the meaning of the term "rights"
will lead to a definition which can be used in determining if the Com-
merce Clause embraces individual rights.
39. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the first
amendment are part of section 1983 rights).
40. 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (incorporating fifteenth amendment voting rights under
section 1983).
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (allowing a section 1983 remedy for the violation of
equal protection rights under the fourteenth amendment).
42. 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (including property rights as rights cognizable under
section 1983).
43. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 14 (Powell, J., dissenting).
44. D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.3, at 363 (3d ed. 1989).
45. Wald, supra note 31, at 282.
46. Justice Powell has also stated that section 1983's history should guide the
Court's interpretation of this statute. See Matasar, Personal Immunities, supra note 1,
at 752 (relying on the Court's opinion in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421
(1976) for this proposition).
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B. The Legislative History of Section 1983
In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, Justice
Stevens, speaking for a majority of the Court, stated that "in all cases
of statutory construction, our task is to interpret the words of these
statutes in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve. ' 47 The first
Supreme Court case to imbue section 1983 with a substantively broad
scope based on an examination of the statute's legislative history and
purposes was Monroe v. Pape.48 In that case, the Court considered
whether 13 police officers, who had broken into the petitioner's home
without a search warrant and arrested him without an arrest warrant,
had acted under color of state law in order to allow the petitioner's
claim of relief under section 1983 against both the officers and the City
of Chicago.49 In deciding that the action against the officers alone was
permissible while the action against the City was not, the Court noted
that section 1983 was enacted in response to the Ku Klux Klan's activi-
ties against the freedmen and other minorities in the South:
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union ren-
dering life and property insecure and the carrying of the mails and
the collection of the revenue dangerous. The proof that such a con-
dition of affairs exists in some localities is now before the Senate.
That the power to correct these evils is beyond the control of State
authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the Executive of the
United States, acting within the limits of existing laws, is sufficient
for present emergencies is not clear. Therefore, I urgently recom-
mend such legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall effectu-
ally secure life, liberty, and property, and the enforcement of law
in all parts of the United States .. ..
As revealed by this statement, the proposed legislation sought to elimi-
47. 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979) (considering whether the plaintiffs complaint
stated a claim under the Supremacy Clause which was cognizable under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, and which would provide the lower court with subject matter jurisdiction).
48. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See also Spurrier, supra note 1, at 3 (citing cases
which had, prior to Monroe, limited the scope of section 1983 as a remedy for depriva-
tion of rights, privileges, or immunities).
.49. Monroe, 365 U.S. 167.
50. Id. at 172-73 (quoting President Grant's message to Congress reported in
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1871)). See also Spurrier, .;upra note 1, at 2
(stating that section 1983 was "enacted to protect the newly-freed blacks from the
lawless activities of whites in southern states ...").
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nate state inactivity concerning Klan operations which resulted in de-
nial of equal protection and due process rights to the recently freed
slaves of the South.51
The Monroe Court went on to point out three purposes of section
1983 in alleviating this denial of fourteenth amendment rights. First,
the legislation served as a tool to invalidate any "invidious legislation
by States against the rights or privileges of citizens of the United
States." 52 Second, the Court stated that section 1983 provided a rem-
edy where state law is inadequate, and quoted Senator Sherman for
support of this conclusion:
[I]t is said the reason is that any offense may be committed upon a
negro by a white man, and a negro cannot testify in any case
against a white man, so that the only way by which any conviction
can be had in Kentucky in those cases is in the United States
courts, because the United States courts enforce the United States
laws by which-negroes may testify.53
51. U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1 provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Since this amendment was ratified in 1868, only three years before President Grant's
statement, supra at the text accompanying note 50, it is safe to draw the conclusion
that the President's use of the language "effectually secure life, liberty, and property"
was significantly influenced by the fourteenth amendment's Due Process Clause lan-
guage that no "State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. . .," because the language in his statement and that in the Clause is so
similar. Also, the President's use of "enforcement of the laws in all parts of the United
States" implicates the fourteenth amendment's equal protection language, "nor deny
any person . . . the equal protection of the laws," for the same reason.
52. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173 (quoting Congressman Sloss, CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1871)).
53. Id. at 173-74 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 345 (1871)). This
statement provides an example of equal protection denial to blacks at the time. En-
forcement of state laws here would have allowed only racist whites to testify as wit-
nesses in trials of black citizens. An almost irrebuttable presumption of guilt thus arose
which state law would have no effect in curing. Section 1983 presumably offered a
remedy for this denial of equal protection by providing a neutral tribunal which elimi-
nated the racist discrimination between black and white witnesses.
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Finally, section 1983 provided "a federal remedy where the state rem-
edy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice. ' 54 This is
the remedy which would cut to the heart of de facto discrimination
against blacks in the South.5 With these purposes derived from the
legislative history of section 1983 in mind, the Monroe Court ulti-
mately stated that,
one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right
in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect,
intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the
claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immu-
nities guaranteed by the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment might be de-
nied by the state agencies.56
With this statement, and the preceding look at the legislative debates,
it is easy to surmise, as the Court in Monroe did, that the Forty-second
Congress used the term "rights" in the context of fourteenth amend-
ment rights due to the frequent references to the terms and policies
underlying this amendment.57
Based on the intuitive sense of the word, "rights" under the four-
teenth amendment means individual rights aimed at the protection of
people who are denied due process and equal protection of the laws by
state governments. This focus on rights within the context of the four-
teenth amendment has been followed by later Supreme Court decisions.
For instance, the Court in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. recog-
nized that section 1983 "was passed for the express purpose of 'en-
forc[ing] the [p]rovisions of the fourteenth amendment.' ,,51 The Court
went on to state, "the rights that Congress sought to protect in [section
54. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174.
55. Defacto discrimination is the situation where the state's statutes are not dis-
criminatory on their face, but are applied, enforced, or not enforced in such a manner
which effectively discriminates against blacks, and other minorities. The Monroe Court
recognized this in its quotation of Senator Burchard. 365 U.S. at 176-77 (citing CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 653 (1871)). See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189 (1973) (considering the differences between de facto and de jure
discrimination).
56. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180.
57. This conclusion is also supported by the title given to section 1983 when it
was passed by the Forty-second Congress: "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment and for other purposes." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
app. 335 (1871).
58. 405 U.S. at 545.
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1983] were described by the chairman of the House Select committee
that drafted the legislation as 'the enjoyment of life and liberty, with
the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue
and obtain happiness and safety.' "9 Later, in Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Organization, the Court noted that "it is . . . clear
that the prime focus of [C]ongress in all of the relevant legislation was
ensuring a right of action to enforce the protections of the fourteenth
amendment and the federal laws enacted pursuant thereto." 60 If it was
doubted before, this language unequivocally shows that Congress used
the word "rights" with the intent to protect fourteenth amendment per-
sonal or individual rights. These are individual rights because neither
the state nor the federal government has the power to infringe upon
these rights; this is a concept which irresistibly leads to the definition of
section 1983 "rights."'"
C. The Definition of a Right
The major characteristic which separates a right from other con-
stitutional entitlements is that rights cannot be stripped from the indi-
vidual by the government, whether it be state or federal.6 2 This notion
59. Id. at 545 (quoting Representative Shellabarger, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess. app. 69 (1871)).
60. 441 U.S. at 611. See also Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 934
(1982) ("The history of [section 1983] is replete with statements indicating that Con-
gress thought it was creating a remedy as broad as the protection that the [f]ourteenth
[a]mendment affords the individual.").
61. The state or federal government may infringe on these rights in those situa-
tions where the state is permissibly acting pursuant to its police power, or where the
federal government is acting according to its constitutional prerogatives. See generally
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 15-1 to 16-59 (2d ed. 1988). However,
in either of these instances, the governing entity must still pass the Court formulated
strict scrutiny test for statutes and other regulations which infringe on the due process
and equal protection rights of the individual. The reasoning behind such a stringent test
is that neither the states nor the federal government are empowered to regulate these
rights under the Constitution. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 4,
§ 11.4, at 357, § 11.7, at 367. This reasoning will be elaborated upon in the following
sections of this comment.
62. 'See generally J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS 195-205 (1980). Prior articles attempt to establish the existence of Commerce
Clause "rights" by relying on precedential use of the term by the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Claims, supra note 1. The point of the follow-
ing historical discussion in the text is to avoid any misapplication of these usages,
which were derived from specific sets of facts before the Court, by establishing a com-
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of individual rights, if it must be attributed to some point of origin in
United States history, evolved from the "natural law" concept which
flourished in the 18th and 19th centuries.63 During this time, all
branches of the federal and state governments were considered to have
a limited "sphere of authority defined by the nature and function of
that level or branch and by the inherent rights of citizens."64 These
"inherent rights" included the rights to personal security and liberty,
and the right to keep private property. They were rights that in no way
could be limited by the government, simply because its authority and
jurisdiction did not include such a power.6 5 The natural law concept
was a guide to the Court even after ratification of the fourteenth
amendment in 1868, when it would seem that the Court would no
longer need the concept.6"
As discussed above, the fourteenth amendment was passed with
the intent to provide federal authorities with the means to protect due
process and equal protection rights of people who were plagued in the
South by the Ku Klux Klan. These are the same rights which the Su-
preme Court previously included in the natural law category. However,
the Court construed the fourteenth amendment's protection quite nar-
rowly when presented with the Slaughter-House Case.?.17 The reason
for this restricted reading was the Court's fear that the fourteenth
amendment's scope would expand so much that the Court would find
itself adjudicating cases which were properly within the states' jurisdic-
tion.68 However, the amalgamation of the natural law concept and the
mon definition of rights that can be applied to the Commerce Clause analysis.
63. L. TRIBE, supra note 61, § 8-1, at 560, § 15-3, at 1309-10.
64. Id. at 560 (emphasis added).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 565.
67. Id. at 562. The Slaughter-House Cases (Butchers' Benevolent Association v.
Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Co.) decision was that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the fourteenth amendment guaranteed only those
rights of national citizenship including, as the Court stated in dicta, the right,
to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon
that government, to transact any business he may have with it, to seek its
protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions. He
has the right of free access to its seaports, through which all operations of
foreign commerce are conducted, to the subtreasuries, land offices, and
courts of justice in the several States.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872) (quoting Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,
44 (1867)).
68. L. TRIBE, supra note 61, § 8-1, at 565. Recall that this was a period in his-
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language of the fourteenth amendment would alleviate this fear and
allow the Court to embark upon its now infamous journey into the
Lochner era.69 The crux of the line of cases during this period was the
Court's move toward review of government regulations with an eye to
substantive economic due process based on the fourteenth amendment
and natural law concepts.
The Court used the well established limits of natural law to limit
the reach of the fourteenth amendment, and thus protect the states'
existing field of sovereign rights. As Professor Tribe states, "D]ust as
inherent limitations on government guided natural law scrutiny of leg-
islative action, so could they guide federal judicial review under the
fourteenth amendment."1 0 The important development of this time was
the individual right to freedom of contract which arose from the natu-
ral law aspect of the Court's review under the fourteenth amendment.7 1
The freedom of contract theory's evolution began with Allgeyer v. Lou-
isiana,'7 2 continued with Lochner v. New York, 73 and ended with West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish.74 For purposes of this comment, it is sufficient
to note that freedom of contract was an individual right derived from
the now discredited field of substantive economic due process review.
However, the natural law concept underlying the Court's review in this
area is useful in forming a definition of the rights implicated by 42
U.S.C. § 1983.Y
tory when the Court was much less willing to grant power to the federal government at
the cost of diminishing the states' sovereign rights.
69. Id. at 565-66.
70. Id. at 565.
71. Specifically, freedom of contract arose from the natural law concept of the
individual's right to personal liberty. Professor Tribe states that the Court in Barbier v.
Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885), "warned that the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause pro-
tected the freedom to contract and prevented arbitrary deprivations of common-law
liberty--deprivations which by definition could not amount to exercises of the police
power, whose mission was the protection of common-law rights." L. TRIBE, supra note
61, § 8-1, at 566 (emphasis in original). Freedom of contract was derived of the natural
law because the government could not interfere with the individual's exercise of this
right. Interference with this right was not part of the nature and function of the gov-
ernment entity. Thus, freedom of contract was seen as a limit on the scope of the
individual rights created by the fourteenth amendment, because the Court was already
well versed in the limits of the individual's right to personal liberty.
72. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
73. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
74. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 61, § 8-2, at 567.
75. As the Court in Moore v. City of East Cleveland stated:
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this
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Merging the plain meaning and legislative history of section 1983
with the theory underlying the natural law notion results in a definition
of "rights." The plain meaning reveals only that any rights which may
exist under the Constitution and federal laws will be included in section
1983's coverage.76 The legislative history of section 1983 reveals that
the Forty-second Congress intended the statute to reach those depriva-
tions of due process and equal protection rights which the people of the
South suffered during the reconstruction period after the Civil War. 7
What makes these fourteenth amendment guarantees "rights" lies in
the natural law concept which was commonly accepted when both sec-
tion 1983 and the fourteenth amendment were created. As Professor
Tribe states, natural law considered that governing entities were lim-
ited by both the "nature and function" of the entity and by the "inher-
ent rights" of the citizens governed by the entity. 8 Stated another way,
the government was powerless to infringe upon the inherent rights of
the people, due to the concept of natural law, because it was not part of
the nature and function of this entity to do so. It follows then that the
rights held by people under the fourteenth amendment, the rights
which were in the express contemplation of Congress while enacting
section 1983, are immune from government interference because the
purpose of this amendment was to take away the states' power to ram-
pantly continue their interference.79
The definition of "rights" can now be placed on this framework of
section 1983's plain meaning and legislative history, and the natural
Court. There are risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection
to certain substantive liberties without the guidance of the more specific
provisions of the Bill of Rights. As the history of the Lochner era demon-
strates, there is reason for concern lest the only limits to such judicial in-
tervention become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be
Members of this Court [footnote omitted]. That history counsels caution
and restraint. But it does not counsel abandonment ....
431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977). Implicit in this language is the fact that the Court will
continue to draw on concepts of the past, such as natural law concepts, in order to
define certain rights which may be implicated in the future.
76. See supra part A of this section.
77. Id.
78. See L. TRIBE, supra note 61, § 8-1, at 560, § 15-3, at 1:309-10.
79. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651-52 n.10 (1966). This con-
struction of fourteenth amendment rights is as applicable today as it was at the turn of
the century. Though fourteenth amendment rights are not impervious to government
burdens, the governing body must demonstrate some compelling interest for the bur-
den; otherwise, the encroachment is constitutionally invalid. See supra note 61.
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law. Rights are all things which inure to the person upon which that
person can claim to be free of governmental action. 0 The term "all" is
derived from the plain meaning of the word "any" used in section
1983, because by this language, Congress intended that the statute
cover all rights which may exist under the Constitution and federal
laws.
Several courts and commentators have argued about the scope of
section 1983 rights being a factor in determining whether a particular
phrase in the Constitution confers rights within the meaning of this
statute. 1 Questioning the scope of section 1983 rights is inconsequen-
tial to a determination of what the rights are, because defining the
scope of section 1983 rights merely begs the question. As discussed in
part A of this section, the language employed in section 1983, "any
rights," clearly shows that if a right exists, it is within the ambit of
section 1983 rights. Basing the definition of rights upon fourteenth
amendment considerations in no way subtracts from this scope. Rather,
the focus of the fourteenth amendment argument is on this amend-
ment's underlying rights existing as a subset of those rights which are
characteristically immune from governmental interference. This defini-
tion does not attempt to limit section 1983 rights to those included in
the fourteenth amendment, or any other constitutional provision. In-
deed, it is illogical to say that fourteenth amendment rights are in-
80. Professor Choper is in accord with this definition. See generally Choper, The
Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review,
86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977). In his discussion of individual rights versus states' rights,
Choper observes that "[tihe essence of the individual rights claim is that no organ of
government, national or state, may undertake the challenged activity." Id. at 1555. The
very reason this is a right is because the right is immune from government interference
in the same way as the above definition of rights is described. In contrast to individual
rights violations, Choper states that there is the scenario "[w]hen the contention is
made that the national government has engaged in activity beyond its delegated au-
thority, or when it is alleged that an attempted state regulation intrudes into an area of
exclusively national concern . . . ." Id. In this circumstance, it is conceded that either
the state or the federal government has the power to act, "the issue is simply whether
the particular level that has acted is the constitutionally proper one," not whether some
individual right has been violated. Id. As will be discussed in section three of this arti-
cle, this distinction is crucial in determining whether the Commerce Clause confers
individual rights, because a right cannot exist in an area where one of the governmental
actors has the power to act at the exclusion of the others.
81. See, e.g., Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S. 68 (1900); Thompson v. New
York, 487 F. Supp 212 (N.D.N.Y. 1979); Poirier v. Hodges, 445 F. Supp. 838 (M.D.
Fla. 1978); Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Claims, supra note 1, at 184; Comment,
The Commerce Clause, supra note 1, at 764.
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cluded in section 1983, but that other rights under the Constitution and
laws are not, in the face of the absolute use of the term "any" to mod-
ify "rights."
Section 1983's legislative history reveals that the rights Congress
intended to protect were those that "inured" to the individual, for ex-
ample, under the fourteenth amendment. Finally, the natural law con-
cept, upon which the fourteenth amendment and section 1983 were
based, dictates that these "things" are rights because they define the
limits of government power. The next section considers whether a right
exists under the Commerce Clause in light of this definition of the term
"rights."
III. The Relationship Between Rights and the Commerce
Clause
Section one of this comment noted that in its Consolidated
Freightways Corp. v. Kassel decision, the Eighth Circuit avoided defin-
ing a right before concluding that the Commerce Clause does not se-
cure any rights. s2 The court reasoned that the Commerce Clause served
only to alter the power structure between the state and federal govern-
ments, not to secure section 1983 rights.8" Though the court cited in
detail many authorities to support its proposition, it failed to explain
why the Commerce Clause served only to allocate power.8 4 In fact, the
allocation hypothesis is based on the idea that commerce is subject to
regulation by both the state and federal governments. The Supreme
Court has recognized this principle since the time of Gibbons v.
Ogden 5 and Cooley v. Board of Wardens.8 6 The Commerce Clause
82. 730 F.2d at 1144.
83. Id.
84. The same issue has been discussed in the context of the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution, which has also been deemed a power allocation provision. See Note,
Section 1983 Remedies, supra note 1 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's decision in White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams, 810 F.2d 844 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1060 (1987)); cf. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 110 S. Ct. 444,
449 (1989) (stating, "the Supremacy Clause, of its own force, does not create rights
enforceable under [section] 1983 . . .").
85. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196 (Congress' power to regulate under the Com-
merce Clause, "like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, rqay be exer-
cised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in
the [C]onstitution.").
86. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). Cooley established the dormant commerce
clause doctrine which relies on the principle that "if the item [to be regulated] is such
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acts to shift the power of commercial regulation between the state and
federal governments. Where Congress has passed regulatory legislation
pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, the states are precluded from
occupying the field with their own statutes.8 7 Where Congress has not
acted to regulate commerce in a particular area, the states may be al-
lowed to do so under the dormant commerce clause doctrine.88 The
Commerce Clause thus serves to allocate power between Congress and
the States because in any given context, commerce between the states
is subject to regulatory power, and the Commerce Clause determines
which entity may exercise this power. The final question is whether a
right cognizable under section 1983 exists within this structure of the
Commerce Clause. This inquiry reveals that the bifurcated nature of a
right, that which inures to the individual and must be free from gov-
ernment interference for its existence, precludes the existence of a right
under the Commerce Clause.
A. Does the Commerce Clause Inure to the Individual?
The first step in determining whether the Commerce Clause
secures an individual right for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 purposes is to discover
whether the Commerce Clause provides for something which inures to
the individual. This inquiry reveals a possible problem with the alloca-
tion of power hypothesis. At least one commentator has asserted that if
the Commerce Clause serves only to allocate power with disregard to
the individual who is affected, then this individual should not have
standing to bring an action seeking invalidation of a state statute which
violates the Commerce Clause,8 when in actuality he does.90 The argu-
ment continues that because individuals do have standing to bring
that national uniformity is necessitated, then [c]ongressional power is exclusive[, but
if] the item is representative of a peculiarly local concern (even though within the
reach of the [c]ongressional [C]ommerce [C]lause power ... ) warranting a diversity
of treatment, then concurrent state regulation is authorized in the absence of congres-
sional preemption." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 4, § 8.4, at 266.
87. This was the issue presented in Gibbons where New York's licensing law was
in direct conflict with that enacted by Congress pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 53
U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). Because the statute was within Congress' Commerce
Clause power, the Supremacy Clause acted to invalidate the conflicting state statute. L.
TRIBE, supra note 61, § 5-4, at 306.
88. L. TRIBE, supra note 61, §5-4, at 306.
89. Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Claims, supra note 1, at 167-69.
90. See J. CHOPER, supra note 62, at 209.
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Commerce Clause challenges, an implied right exists under this Clause,
which is within the meaning of section 1983 rights. The Commerce
Clause is thus seen to "inure or work for" the use of the individual,
and, therefore, to confer an individual right. However, this conclusion
is not required by the standing doctrine. Further analysis reveals that
even though the Commerce Clause inures to the individual in some re-
spects, it does not provide for individual rights due to its power allocat-
ing nature.
Though the Commerce Clause serves to allocate power between
the state and federal governments, this is not to say that individuals are
not affected by the Commerce Clause. The individual can, and usually
does, have standing in federal courts to challenge a statute that bur-
dens interstate commerce.9" The reason lies in the elements of standing
which the Supreme Court has developed based on Article III of the
Constitution: namely, personal stake, injury-in-fact, causation, and
redressability.92 Based only on the Commerce Clause as an allocation
provision between the state and federal governments, these elements
are easily satisfied using Dennis v. State"3 as an example.
The Nebraska tax statutes applied to tractor-trailer rigs registered
in states other than Nebraska.94 On this basis, the statutes were de-
clared unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.95 Dennis' tractor
was within this class affected by the unconstitutional statutes,96 there-
fore, he had a personal stake in the outcome of the case. Enforcement
of the unconstitutional tax statutes directly caused Dennis to be de-
prived of his money. 91 This satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement.
Dennis' injury is individuated in that the statutes impacted directly on
the tractor he owned, as well as those similarly situated.98 Finally, the
judicial remedy, in this case an injunction barring enforcement of the
statutes, served to alleviate the harm caused by the statutes.99
Since the elements of the standing doctrine are satisfied, Dennis
91. Id.
92. The Article III "case or controversy" requirement derives from U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See L. TRIBE, supra note 61, § 3-14, at 108.
93. 234 Neb. 427, 451 N.W.2d 676 (1990).
94. See supra note 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutes that
were in issue.
95. Dennis, 234 Neb. at 428, 451 N.W.2d at 678.
96. Id. at 442, 451 N.W.2d at 685.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 428, 451 N.W.2d at 678.
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would have standing to bring the case into federal court. But at no
point in this analysis is it necessary, or even helpful, to say that an
individual right must exist under the Commerce Clause in order for the
individual to have standing in the federal courts. However, it is appar- -
ent that Dennis is somehow affected by the Clause's operation in this
case, and that this operation inures to him as an individual, because
applying the Clause to invalidate the Nebraska statutes is a direct ben-
efit to Dennis who no longer has to pay the taxes while driving in the
state. Thus, it is possible to satisfy the "inures to the individual" part
of the definition of "rights" related in section two.
A Commerce Clause plaintiff must also satisfy the Court's pruden-
tial standing requirements.100 As the Supreme Court stated, "a plaintiff
may still lack standing under the prudential principles by which the
judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where
no individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the fed-
eral courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim." 101
Use of the term "individual rights" would seem to imply that if the
Court recognizes the plaintiff's standing to sue, it must also, impliedly,
recognize that the plaintiff is vindicating a right. Further, because the
Supreme Court has allowed plaintiffs to sue based on state violations of
the Commerce Clause, this arguably implies that the plaintiffs are vin-
dicating an individual right under this Clause. However, this conclusion
does not follow from a consideration of the Court's prudential standing
elements.
Three "prudential principles" exist which can bar a litigant from
suing in federal court.' 0 2 The Commerce Clause litigant easily meets
all three of these requirements without the hypothesized implication of
100. See Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Claims, supra note 1, at 168-69.
101. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979) (em-
phasis added). See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (distinguishing between,
and describing, the Article III case or controversy and prudential standing
requirements).
102. These principles are: "plaintiff's interest must come within the 'zone of in-
terests' arguably protected or regulated by the law in question, [Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970);] ...the courts will
not hear 'generalized grievances' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large
class of citizens, [United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974);] . . .[and] plain-
tiff must assert his own legal interests rather than those of third parties, [Tileston v.
Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943)]." C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 13, at
70-71 (4th ed. 1983). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 61, § 3-14, at 108 (discussing the
Court's prudential standing requirements).
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an individual right under the Commerce Clause. This is evident by
again using Dennis v. State0 3 as an example.
First, Dennis was in the "zone of interests" regulated by the Ne-
braska tax statutes, because he was within the class of people who had
to pay road-use taxes pursuant to the statutory scheme.o4 The second
tier of the prudential standing limitations is satisfied, because Dennis'
complaint is more than a generalized grievance shared by citizens at
large. Rather, Dennis sustained injury-in-fact by having to pay one to
two cents per mile of highway driven in Nebraska due to this state's
error in enacting the tax statutes. 0 5 Finally, though Dennis can be seen
to have asserted Congress' interests under the Commerce Clause in
protecting interstate commerce from burdensome state statutes by
seeking to enjoin their enforcement, Dennis was also asserting his own
interests in alleviating the injury caused him by the unconstitutional
Nebraska tax statutes. Thus, even though assertion of Congress'
"rights" helped Dennis in his case against Nebraska, the point of Den-
nis' complaint was not vindication of Congress' interests, but vindica-
tion of his own injury, lost money, caused by the Nebraska statutes.
With this, Dennis' complaint satisfies the Court's prudential standing
elements without invoking an individual right under the Commerce
Clause.
As this example demonstrates, satisfaction of the Supreme Court's
prudential standing requirements is not predicated on the plaintiff's as-
sertion of an individual right under the Commerce Clause. The simple
fact that the plaintiff had to, for instance, pay money when he was not
legally obliged to do so is sufficient to satisfy these standing require-
ments. The prudential standing limitations do not necessitate the plain-
tiff's assertion of his own rights. Rather, the plaintiff need only show
sustained injury in order to overcome the prudential standing hurdle.
Commerce Clause plaintiffs meet this requirement due to the economic
injury, as in the Dennis case, caused to them by enforcement of state
statutes which violate the Commerce Clause. 0 6 However, it is apparent
103. 234 Neb. 427, 451 N.W.2d 676 (1990).
104. Id. at 442, 451 N.W.2d at 685.
105. Id. See also J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE §
6.3, at 327 (1985) (stating that this element requires a showing of injury-in-fact).
106. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), is also a case where the prudential
standing limitations were met based on economic injury. The Court allowed the plain-
tiff doctor to assert the constitutional rights of his patients where enforcement of the
state statute against the patients would have caused the doctor injury in the form of
lost medical fees. Also, in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S.
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here, as with the Article III standing analysis above, that the Com-
merce Clause does provide some protection which inures to the individ-
ual. For the Clause to confer an individual right, though, it must also
protect the individual from government action at both the state and
federal levels.
B. Does the Commerce Clause Enable the Individual to be Free
from Government Interference?
The Commerce Clause falls short as a provision for rights due to
its failure to provide something that could be called a right upon which
a person could claim to be free of government interference. The district
court opinion in Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel explicitly
recognized this principle by quoting Professor Choper's work in the
field of federalism. 107 The court relied on Choper's statement that
"'[t]he essence of a claim . ..which falls into the individual rights
category of constitutional issues .. .is that no organ of government,
national or state, may undertake the challenged activity'" to distin-
guish rights from benefits under the Commerce Clause.10 8 The court
quoted further from Choper: "'In contrast, when a person alleges that
one of the federalism provisions of the Constitution has been violated,
he implicitly concedes that one of the two levels of' govern-
ment-national or state-has power to engage in the questioned con-
duct,'" and stated that "[t]he dormant [c]ommerce [c]lause doctrine is
clearly a 'federalism' provision within Prof[essor] Choper's framework,
because a dormant [c]ommerce [c]lause action does not deny govern-
ment power altogether . . . ,,.o8
The district court's reasoning in Consolidated Freightways Corp.
relied on the notion that the Commerce Clause is a power allocating
provision of the Constitution, as evidenced by the court's recognition
that commerce is subject to regulation, and that it is just a matter of
which "level" of government can regulate within the Commerce Clause
1124 (1977), the Court found standing with a dealer of 3.2% beer who asserted the
equal protection rights of males under an Oklahoma drinking age statute which injured
the dealer due to the lost profits of sales to the restricted males.
107. 556 F. Supp. 740, 746 (1983), affid, 730 F.2d 1139 (1984). In affirming the
district court's reasoning, the court of appeals noted that the district court opinion was
"well reasoned." Consolidated Freightways Corp., 730 F.2d at 1143.
108. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 556 F. Supp. at 746 (quoting J. CHOPER,
supra note 62, at 175).
109. Id.
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limitations. As this comment's definition of rights states, in order for a
right to exist, the individual who claims its existence must also be able
to claim that the right is free from government interference or revoca-
tion. As the court concludes in Consolidated Freightways Corp., based
in part on Choper's reasoning, because the Commerce Clause always
admits to at least one government entity with power over commerce,
the concomitant presence of a right is precluded due to the nature of
that right's existence, requiring freedom from government power at all
levels."'
However, the question arises that if the Commerce Clause does
not secure rights, then how is the individual affected by the operation
of this clause? The answer was succinctly given by the Eighth Circuit
in Consolidated Freightways Corp.: "[I]ndividuals are oftentimes
benefitted through the indirect protection resulting from the limitations
placed on the states through the dormant [c]ommerce [c]lause doctrine
... ,,11 The court's statement is true in the sense that what individu-
als derive from the Commerce Clause can be taken away at an instant.
This is the nature of a benefit as the word is used by the above court.
No matter what it is called, the effect of the Commerce Clause on the
individual is not a right, because the effect, whether beneficial or not,
can be legislated away by the state or federal government at any time.
The distinction, therefore, between a right and a benefit is that a right
exists of its own force and is not subject to government action abridg-
ing its exercise by the individual. A benefit, on the other hand, exists
according to some governmental provision which can be taken away at
any time. This distinction is clear in Champion v. Ames" 2 where the
Court upheld federal legislation, enacted pursuant to Congress' Com-
merce Clause power, which forbade the interstate transport of lottery
tickets. If there is an individual right to engage in the interstate com-
merce of lottery tickets, or to be free of state statutes which forbid such
commerce, how is it that Congress can eradicate this right? By nature,
a right is something that cannot be taken away by government, such as
the right to free speech under the first amendment, or the right to be
free of warrantless searches and seizures under the fourth amend-
ment. 1 3 Therefore, Congress, as well as the states, should not be able
to take away the "right" to engage in interstate transport of lottery
110. Id. at 748.
111. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 730 F.2d at 1145.
112. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
113. See supra section two of this comment.
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tickets, or to be free of state statutes which do this, under the Com-
merce Clause if it confers a right. The answer to the question lies in
the fact that it is based on an improper premise that a right exists
under the Commerce Clause.
Before the congressional legislation banning transport of lottery
tickets, the individual could claim the benefit, under the Commerce
Clause's allocation of power to Congress, of being free to transport lot-
tery tickets in interstate commerce. This is not a right though, because
Congress could act at any time, as" it did, to forbid the transport."14 The
individual also does not have the right to be free of state statutes which
forbid this commerce because either Congress could act to allow the
states to do this, or the Court may determine that the state was pursu-
ing a permissible governmental interest in forbidding the transport.1 5
Either way, the freedom to engage in interstate commerce is subject to
termination by a government entity, termination which is not compati-
ble with the existence of a right but which is compatible with the exis-
tence of a benefit. This distinction made between rights and benefits
under the Commerce Clause by the court in Consolidated Freightways
Corp. is viable, and is supported by the Nebraska Supreme Court's
decision in Dennis v. State and the cases cited therein. 16
IV. Cases in Support of the Commerce Clause as an
Allocation Provision
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Dennis v. State, relied on the
majority of cases speaking to the "rights" issue which held that the
Commerce Clause, as a power allocation provision of the Constitution,
did not include individual rights as the term is used in 42 U.S.C. §
1983.117 The foremost authority in this area is the court of appeals
opinion in Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, based on the
number of courts which have adopted the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in
this case. These courts concluded, as the Nebraska Supreme Court and
the Eighth Circuit did, that the nature of the Commerce Clause as a
114. Champion, 188 U.S. at 325.
115. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).
116. 234 Neb. 427, 451 N.W.2d 676.
117. Id at 427, 451 N.W.2d at 676. It was stated in Private Truck Council of
America v. Quinn, that "the weight of authority" supports the prior decisions that
violation of the Commerce Clause "is not cognizable in an action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983." 476 U.S. 1129 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (Justices Brennan and O'Connor
joined in this dissent.).
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power allocation provision of the Constitution precludes the existence
of an individual right for the purposes of a section 1983 claim of relief.
One of the cases which adopted the Consolidated Freightways
Corp. reasoning was Kraft v. Jackax" 8 which involved "a section 1983
action against members of the Nevada Gaming Control Board after the
board refused to extend further licensing to the plaintiffs when their 1-
year limited gaming licenses expired." 119 The plaintiffs argued that
their Commerce Clause "rights" had been violated when the Gaming
Board issued a stop order on the sale of out-of-state securities in which
plaintiffs had an interest.120 Relying in part on the Consolidated
Freightways Corp. decision, the Ninth Circuit stated, "assuming that
the Board's actions in any way implicated the Commerce Clause, the
plaintiffs cannot state a cause of action under [section] 1983 for viola-
tion of the Clause" because the Clause was an allocation of power pro-
vision which the section 1983 remedy was not intended to cover.12 x
Thus, the court relied on the allocation of power concept to deny the
existence of a right under the Commerce Clause.
Another case which relied on the Consolidated Freightways Corp.
allocation of power concept was Pesticide Public Policy Foundation v.
Village of Wauconda,22 involving a Village ordinance which regulated
the use of pesticides within its jurisdiction. Among other claims, the
Foundation asserted that the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause,
and sought attorney's fees for its members pursuant to a section 1983
claim.'2 In dictum, after the court decided that the Foundation did not
have standing to sue on behalf of its members for fees, the court stated
that the "Commerce Clause relates not to individual rights, but rather
to the distribution of power between the state and federal govern-
118. 872 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1989).
119. Dennis, 234 Neb. at 433, 451 N.W.2d at 680.
120. Kraft, 872 F.2d at 869.
121. Id. The court also relied on its own decision in White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Williams, 810 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1060 (1987).
That case involved an Arizona taxing scheme which the plaintiff Tribe alleged con-
flicted with federal regulations, and was, therefore, in violation of the Supremacy
Clause. Id. at 846. The plaintiff succeeded in overcoming the state statute but failed in
its attempt to secure attorney's fees under section 1988 for a violation of Supremacy
Clause rights. Id. at 850. The Ninth Circuit viewed the Supremacy Clause as a provi-
sion, like the Commerce Clause, which allocates power between the state and federal
governments. Id. at 849. See also Note, Section 1983 Remedies, supra note 1.
122. 622 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Ill. 1985), afid, 826 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987).
123. Id. at 426.
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ments" and on this basis, concluded that section 1983 does not support
violations of the Commerce Clause.12 4 With this, the court accepted the
allocation of powers concept and held that attorney's fees could not be
awarded for a Commerce Clause violation.
The Tenth Circuit, in J & J Anderson v. Town of Erie,125 also
denied section 1988 attorney's fees for Commerce Clause violations
based on the allocation of power concept. The Town of Erie passed an
ordinance which prohibited certain airplanes from landing within its
borders. 12 The ordinance was later repealed, but the plaintiff sought
attorney's fees for the violation of, among other things, his rights under
the Commerce Clause. 27 The court concluded that "[t]he Commerce
Clause . . ., although limiting the power of the states to interfere in
areas of national concern, [does] not secure rights cognizable under
[section] 1983," and denied the plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees
under section 1988.128 With this, the Tenth Circuit also fell in line with
those cases stating that the Commerce Clause, as a constitutional pro-
vision which serves to allocate power between the levels of government,
does not confer section 1983 rights. 29
Several federal courts would expressly allow the Commerce Clause
124. Id. at 435-36. The Pesticide court also relied on the Seventh Circuit holding
in Gould, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 750
F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1984), which in turn relied on the Consolidated Freightways Corp.,
730 F.2d 1139, allocation of power analysis, that the Supremacy Clause does not se-
cure rights within the meaning of section 1983. Pesticide Pub. Policy Found., 622 F.
Supp. at 435.
125. 767 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1985).
126. Id. at 1471.
127. Id. at 1472.
128. Id. at 1476.
129. Several state cases also denied section 1988 attorney's fees for Commerce
Clause violations, based on the allocation of powers reasoning in Consolidated Freight-
ways Corp., 730 F.2d 1139. See, e.g., State v. Private Truck Council, Inc., 258 Ga.
531, 371 S.E.2d 378 (1988) (Georgia highway-user tax statutes violating the Com-
merce Clause did not implicate section 1983 rights); Private Truck Council, Inc. v.
State, 221 N.J. Super. 89, 534 A.2d 13 (1987), af'd, 111 N.J. 214, 544 A.2d 33
(1988) (retaliatory New Jersey tax on out-of-state truckers violating the Commerce
Clause does not violate any section 1983 rights); Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Secre-
tary of State, 503 A.2d 214 (Me.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1129 (1986) (reciprocal
Maine taxes on out-of-state truckers which violated the Commerce Clause did not im-
plicate rights under section 1983); Private Truck Council, Inc. v. State, 128 N.H. 466,
517 A.2d 1150 (1986) (relying on Private Truck Council, Inc., 503 A.2d 214, to state
that section 1983 rights are not involved with state statutes that burden interstate com-
merce by taxing trucks registered in other states).
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cause of action under section 1983 in opposition to the authorities
above. One of these is Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v.
Moe.130 In an action seeking to enjoin enforcement of a Montana tax of
cigarette sales by the plaintiff tribes, an issue was raised by the defend-
ant that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1341 which prohibits, among other things, enjoining state tax-
ation where an efficient remedy can be had in the state's courts.' 3' In
the court's conclusion that 28 U.S.C. § 1362 granted subject matter
jurisdiction over the tribes' claims, the court also stated that it had
jurisdiction over the individual plaintiffs' claims under the jurisdictional
counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), because these
plaintiffs had alleged violations of the Commerce Clause which secured
rights cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.132 The basis for the court's
conclusion was a prior statement made by the Supreme Court in Lynch
v. Household Finance Corp. that the section 1983 phrase "'rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws includes
not only [f]ourteenth [a]mendment .rights, but '[all of] the Constitu-
tion [and] laws of the United States.' "133 The district court's reliance
on Lynch was improper, and did not serve to prove that section 1983
rights exist under the Commerce Clause.
The Lynch Court's dictum was not stated pursuant to a determina-
tion under the Commerce Clause. Instead, the case dealt with whether
there was a viable distinction between personal and property rights for
purposes of a section 1983 claim of relief under the fourteenth amend-
ment.' Also, and perhaps more importantly, the Court's statement
only revealed the intent to apply section 1983 to rights which existed
beyond the fourteenth amendment context and did so without defining
these rights.135 Thus, the Kootenai conclusion, based on the Supreme
Court's decision in Lynch does not support a conclusion that individual
rights exist under the Commerce Clause.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in affirming the decision in Koo-
tenai, made statements which also discredit the district court's decision
130. 392 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Mont. 1974), affid on other grounds, 425 U.S. 463
(1976).
131. Id. at 1301-02.
132. Id. at 1304.
133. Id. at 1305 (emphasis in original) (quoting Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 549 n.16 (1972)).
134. Lynch, 405 U.S. at 542.
135. Id. at 556.
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that the Commerce Clause conferred section 1983 rights." 6 First, the
Court decided the case based only on the tribes' claims.13 The Court
went on to say in a footnote that "if only the individual Indians have
standing to sue for refunds, their claims must be properly grounded
jurisdictionally."1 38 This statement called into question the district
court's belief that the individual plaintiffs' Commerce Clause claims
implicated rights which provided jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although not dispositive, the Court's
dictum suggests that the district court acted improperly in predicating
jurisdiction on an alleged Commerce Clause rights violation. 39
The court in Kennecott Corp. v. Smith would also allow the sec-
tion 1983 claim of relief under the Commerce Clause.14 The court
considered whether to invalidate a New Jersey statute which the plain-
tiff alleged was in conflict with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1"1
In determining whether the federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. §
2283, barred plaintiff's request for an injunction, the court stated that
"actions brought under [section] 1983, such as this case, are explicit
exceptions to the anti-injunction act."'' 4  In a footnote, the court sup-
ported this statement by saying that "[t]he present action is properly
brought under section 1983 because it seeks redress for deprivations of
constitutional rights secured by the Commerce Clause and of federal
statutory rights protected by the [Securities Exchange Act,]' 43 and
cited Maine v. Thiboutot as authority.14 4
Two problems exist with relying on Thiboutot for the proposition
that the Commerce Clause secures section 1983 rights. The first is that
136. Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1975).
137. Id. at 474-75, 475 n.14.
138. Id. at 468 n.7.
139. Id; see also Connor v. Rivers, 25 F. Supp. 937, 938 (N.D. Ga. 1938) (stat-
ing that a Georgia statute violating the Commerce Clause did not affect any rights for
jurisdictional purposes under § 1343(3) (then codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41(14)), aff'd
mem., 305 U.S. 576 (1939).
140. 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980).
141. Id. at 183.
142. Id. at 186.
143. Id. at 186 n.5. See also Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d
558 (6th Cir. 1982) (relying solely on Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, to allow a section 1983
action under the Commerce Clause); ANR Pipeline Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 608 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Mich. 1984) (similarly relying on Thiboutot, 448
U.S. 1, and, in turn, Kennecott Corp., 637 F.2d 181, to allow the section 1983 action
under the Commerce Clause).
144. 448 U.S. 1 (1980)
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the Kennecott Corp. court provided absolutely no reasoning for its con-
clusion, which is relegated to a footnote. 145 Second, the Thiboutot case
relied upon by the court does not stand for the propcsition that the
Commerce Clause confers individual rights. Rather, the Thiboutot
Court held that section 1983 provided a remedy for all violations of
federal statutes which create individual rights. 46 The court in Kenne-
cott relied on the Supreme Court's statement that "the section 1983
remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as
constitutional law."'x47 Either way, the reliance on Thiboutot was mis-
placed, because that case did not address whether rights existed under
the Commerce Clause. 48
145. Kennecott, 637 F.2d at 186 n.5.
146. 448 U.S. at 4.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 730 F.2d at 1143. Several Supreme Court
cases also seem to contradict the conclusion that the Commerce Clause supports no
individual rights due to language asserting that individuals have a right to engage in
interstate commerce. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967); Oklahoma
v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 260 (1911); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 21 (1910); Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 57 (1891); Cran-
dall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824). All except one of these decisions, Garrity v. New Jersey, were
handed down during the time that the freedom of contract concept was still in exis-
tence, and even Garrity expressly relied on Western Union for its decision. Garrity, 385
U.S. at 500. As stated in section two of this comment, the Lochner era relied on the
natural law inherent rights of citizens to limit government action. The Court's state-
ments that an individual right to engage in interstate commerce existed would seem to
further the natural law's application to limit state infringement on commerce between
the states. In any case, the Court's recognition of this right is strictly limited to the
theories of that time period which have since been abrogated by the Court. See also L.
TRIBE, supra note 61, §§ 8-5 to 8-6 (generally describing the reasons for the downfall
of Lochnerism). Abandonment of these theories "restricted the ability of the Justices to
rely upon a natural law or openly subjective basis for defining liberty and individual
constitutional rights." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 4, § 11.7, at
367. Since the Court's abrogation of the theories which supported the Lochner era
cases, the Court was no longer in a position to declare that a right to engage in inter-
state commerce existed, because the foundation for such a statement had been wiped
away. This is evident because the Court has never since mentioned a right to engage in
interstate commerce. This lack of authority is what provided the impetus for the de
novo determination of whether a right existed under the Commerce Clause in cases
such as Consolidated Freightways Corp., 730 F.2d 1139, and Dennis v. State, 234
Neb. 427, 451 N.W.2d 676, and law review articles like Note, Dormant Commerce
Clause Claims, supra note 1. It is also evident due to the Supreme Court's grant of
certiorari to Dennis in order to finally resolve the issue of Commerce Clause rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dennis v. Higgins, 110 S. Ct 2559 (1990).
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In light of the predominant body of case law, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court understandably denied the plaintiff's claim under section
1983 for violation of alleged Commerce Clause rights.1 49 The majority
of courts which have considered this issue relied on the power allocat-
ing nature of the Commerce Clause to conclude that the Clause does
not provide for individual rights, which would allow a claim for attor-
ney's fees under section 1988 based on a section 1983 right. The only
problem with the reasoning of these authorities is their failure to ade-
quately consider why the Commerce Clause serves only to allocate
power between the different levels of government, and to define the
term "rights" before concluding that the power allocating nature of the
Commerce Clause precludes the existence of rights under this
Clause. 150 However, by carefully defining 42 U.S.C. § 1983's use of
rights,1 51 and closely examining the relationship of the Commerce
Clause with the federal and state governments, and within history,1 52
the above discussion shows that the reasoning employed by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court in Dennis v. State, as well as those cases which
serve to support Dennis, was well founded.153
Conclusion
As evidenced by the grant of certiorari in the Nebraska case of
Dennis v. State, the Supreme Court is concerned with the issue of
whether the Commerce Clause protects individual rights cognizable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which can be used to base an award of attor-
ney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. By examining the plain meaning
and legislative history of section 1983, it is possible to develop a con-
crete definition of a right, a definition which reveals that its existence
requires freedom from government action. When this definition is inter-
twined with a consideration of the purposes which give life to the Com-
merce Clause, the result is that the power allocating nature of this con-
stitutional clause, necessary for the commercial security of a country
149. Dennis, 234 Neb. 427, 451 N.W.2d 676.
150. See supra note 8 and accompanying text, which references other articles
that have recognized this flaw.
151. See supra section two of this article, stating that a right is anything which
inures to the person upon which that person can claim to be free of government action.
152. See supra section three of this article, describing the nature of,the Com-
merce Clause as a constitutional provision which serves to allocate power between the
state and federal governments.
153. 234 Neb. 427, 451 N.W.2d 676.
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comprised of fifty sovereign states, precludes the concurrent existence
of an individual right. Thus, the majority of courts which have consid-
ered the Commerce Clause issue and which have concluded that the
Commerce Clause does not secure rights within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to allow an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. §
1988 are correct in their decisions.
Holiday Hunt Russell
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